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This paper attempts to discern from financial market data the impact of greater 
monetary policy transparency over the period since the late 1980s. We examine 
whether interest rate variability has changed, the degree to which financial markets 
anticipate policy moves and movements in the yield curve at the time of changes in 
monetary policy. Where possible, we compare the results for Australia with other 
countries. We find that interest rate volatility at the short end has fallen 
dramatically since the late 1980s. The extent to which market participants 
anticipate changes in the policy rate has gradually risen, as has the speed of 
reaction to interest rate announcements. Since the late 1990s, bill futures contract 
prices have responded to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) commentaries on 
the economy. These results are consistent with an increase in the efficiency with 
which the market digests economic news. The results are quite similar across 
countries, and it is difficult to isolate from cross-country data any specific 
preferred model of monetary policy transparency. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past 10 to 15 years, central banks around the world have taken a 
number of steps to improve the effectiveness of their communication about 
monetary policy decisions and their rationale. In Australia there were a number of 
important changes including the introduction of announcements for changes to the 
target cash rate from January 1990, the subsequent adoption of an inflation target 
and the formalisation of the targeting framework in the Statement on the Conduct 
of Monetary Policy in 1996. These changes had the effect of making explicit the 
Reserve Bank’s framework of instruments and objectives for monetary policy. In 
addition, there has been a significant expansion in the Bank’s published 
commentary and analysis relating to the economy and monetary policy in recent 
years. This has taken place through a number of devices including the quarterly 
Statement on Monetary Policy, Bulletin articles, public addresses and reporting by 
the Governor to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, 
Finance and Public Administration. 
These developments, often referred to under the general heading of increased 
transparency, might be expected to have resulted in financial markets being better 
informed and therefore better able to anticipate policy decisions and respond more 
efficiently to economic data than was formerly the case. This paper attempts to 
discern from financial market data the extent to which this has occurred in 
Australia and, where possible, to provide comparisons with results in similar 
countries. We find that: (i) interest rate volatility at the short end of the yield curve 
has fallen dramatically since the late 1980s; (ii) the extent to which market 
participants anticipate changes in the policy rate has gradually risen; (iii) the speed 
of reaction to interest rate announcements has increased; and (iv)  bill futures 
contract prices appear to respond to RBA commentaries on the economy. These 
results are consistent with an increase in the efficiency with which the market   2
digests economic news. However, it is difficult to isolate from cross-country data 
any specific preferred model of monetary policy transparency. 
2.  Financial Market Consequences of Increased Monetary Policy 
Transparency 
The empirical work presented in this section focuses on two key issues: whether 
increased transparency over the years has been associated with higher or lower 
interest rate volatility; and second, whether this has helped financial markets to 
better predict future interest rate outcomes. On the first issue, a simple method is to 
examine various measures of volatility of financial market prices. The second issue 
is more complicated to evaluate. One approach is to examine whether the degree to 
which markets have anticipated policy changes has risen. We also conduct 
event-study analyses to evaluate the impact of policy announcements and other 
economic information from the RBA on short-term interest rates. In addition we 
examine movements in the yield curve at the time of monetary policy changes; 
improved understanding of the monetary policy framework and stronger anchoring 
of inflation expectations would be likely to show up in smaller surprise movements 
in short maturity interest rates and a dampened impact of policy rate movements at 
the long end of the yield curve. 
Before examining these effects, some descriptive statistics of cash rate moves are 
presented in Table 1. Three time periods are shown which broadly correspond to 
different stages of monetary policy communication arrangements at the RBA. This 
might give the impression that the moves towards greater transparency were 
characterised by distinct shifts. This would be an oversimplification, but for the 
purposes of the following analysis it is instructive to attempt to identify separate 
periods. The first period is from 1986 to 1989, which corresponds to the time 
before a cash rate target was announced. The second period is from 1990 to 
July 1996. This can be thought of as a transitional period during which there were 
a number of important initiatives including the first articulation of the inflation 
target. The third period runs from August 1996 until the present.1 The start date of 
the third period corresponds to the release of the Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy, which formalised the inflation-targeting framework. 
                                           
1  In Section 2.4, we allow this breakpoint to vary and analyse the results. 
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Several characteristics from Table 1 are noteworthy. The average size of moves in 
the cash rate target has significantly declined. Between 1986 and 1989 the average 
absolute movement was 129 basis points, whereas since mid 1996 it has been 
35 basis points. Since policy changes were announced, and reflecting a more stable 
macroeconomic context, there has also been an increase in the average number of 
trading days between moves. Despite a longer time span, over the last two time 
periods the number of sign changes (i.e., moves that reverse the direction of the 
previous move) has fallen from 5 to 3. Finally, reflecting the growing tendency to 
announce cash rate changes at a set time on the day following Board meetings, the 
proportion of cash rate moves occurring on that schedule has risen sharply to over 
80 per cent on average since August 1996, and to 100 per cent since 
December 1998. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Moves in the Target Cash Rate 



















January 1986 to 
December 1989
(b) 
19 11  129  53  5 
January 1990 to 
July 1996 
19 37    87  87  3 
August 1996 to 
December 2002 
18 83    35  89  3 
Notes:   (a) The proportion of rate moves on the day following Board meetings. 
  (b) During this period where there was no official target cash rate, policy changes were identified based
on the midpoint of the informal band used by the RBA’s domestic trading desk. 
 
2.1  Impact on Interest Rate Volatility 
There is no single model of monetary policy transparency, and communication 
arrangements differ across countries in various respects depending partly on the 
governance and accountability structures in place in each country.2 Nonetheless, as 
noted above, there has been a general trend towards increased transparency in most 
central banks over the past 10 to 15 years. The effect of this trend on the volatility 
of financial markets could in theory be quite complex. An improvement in the flow 
                                           
2  See Mahadeva and Sterne (2000) and Schich and Seitz (2000) for a cross-country discussion 
of monetary policy frameworks. 
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of information to markets should reduce uncertainty and more closely anchor key 
financial prices to their fundamental determinants, but it would also mean that 
prices respond more rapidly to news. Another complexity is that not all measures 
designed to increase transparency necessarily result in better use of available 
information by markets if the information is poorly managed or carries the risk of 
being misinterpreted. Notwithstanding these complexities, it seems plausible to 
think that the improved availability of information about monetary policy decision-
making would have reduced interest rate volatility during the period under review. 
Consistent with that interpretation, the volatility of short-term interest rates in 
Australia has declined dramatically over the past 15 years. This is evident in a 
range of measures, such as a rolling average of absolute daily changes in bank bill 
yields or a rolling standard deviation, and to a lesser extent in the coefficient of 
variation in bank bill yields. It is also illustrated by the measure in Figure 1 which 
indicates days when the 90-day bank bill rate moved by more than 10 basis points, 
the equivalent for Australia of about one standard deviation of the daily change in 
90-day bank bill rates over the period shown. This measure, by focusing on 
relatively large movements, attempts to capture interest rate surprises and to 
abstract from any increase in volatility linked to a greater frequency of signals, 
which would be likely to result in an increased number of small daily moves. A 
substantial decline in this measure of volatility occurred after the RBA decided in 
1990 to announce an operational target for the cash rate. While there was a brief 
period of greater volatility around 1994, there have subsequently been only a small 
number of days when bill yields moved by more than 10 basis points. 
A large part of the overall fall in volatility has been a global phenomenon due to a 
lower general level of nominal rates, as inflation levels have fallen, and greater 
macroeconomic stability. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that volatility of 
Australian 90-day bank bills is similar to, or lower than, the other countries shown 
in Figure 1. Prominent reductions in volatility occurred in Canada in 1996 and 
New Zealand in 1999, when these central banks moved to announcing official 
overnight rate targets, and in Sweden after 1992, when the peg with the ECU was 
abandoned. Apart from these instances, it is difficult to isolate particular 
transparency measures that have noticeably reduced volatility of short-term rates in 
different countries. In the past three years, volatility appears to have been quite 
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similar in all the countries examined, regardless of the exact arrangements in each 
country.3 
Figure 1: Volatility of 3-month Interest Rate 


























































1997 1992 2002 1997 1992 1987  
Notes:   Some moves are larger than 200 basis points, mainly associated with periods of stress on the European 
Monetary System in the early 1990s. Swedish data are not available before March 1991. 
Sources:  Bloomberg; Federal Reserve; RBA; RBNZ; Thomson Financial Datastream 
                                           
3  The standard deviation of the daily change in 3-month paper for all countries was between 
2.8 and 4.5 basis points over the period 1999–2002, with the standard deviation of Australian 
90-day bank bills at 3.5 basis points. 
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2.2  Impact on Market Responses to Cash Rate Moves 
The response of market interest rates to announced changes in monetary policy 
provides a measure of the extent to which market participants were surprised by 
the action and whether they were induced to revise their outlook about the future 
path of interest rates.4 Thus, the magnitude of the movement depends on the 
predictability of policy and the ability of investors to read future policy intent from 
current information. A priori, one would expect that the more transparent the 
central bank, the higher the degree to which the financial markets anticipate policy 
moves, implying a more muted response in the short-term interest rate market on 
the day of the announcement. 
One aspect of this concerns the distinction between scheduled and unscheduled 
policy announcements. Scheduled announcements are likely to be easier for 
financial markets to anticipate and consistent with that, the data in Figure 2 show 
that these have generally been associated with smaller reactions in interest rate 
markets to cash rate moves. The average size of the response for 30- and 90-day 
bank bills is at least halved when the change in the target cash rate occurred on a 
day following a scheduled meeting of the RBA Board. In fact, when the rate moves 
occurred the day after Board meetings, the market movement was often as low as 
the average daily change in market interest rates during the previous four weeks. 
Hence, an increase in the relative prevalence of scheduled versus unscheduled 
announcements would be one factor contributing to a reduced average impact of 
policy announcements on market interest rates. 
                                           
4  For example, Hardy (1998) estimates the reaction of market interest rates to both the 
anticipated and unanticipated components of Bundesbank monetary policy moves from 
1985–1995. On the day of rate moves, the response to the anticipated change is not 
significantly different from zero, with only the unanticipated component having a systematic 
effect on market rates. This supports our assumption that the change in market interest rates 
on the day of rate moves is a measure of the unanticipated, or surprise component, of a policy 
move. 
   7
Figure 2: Market Response to Monetary Policy Moves 
Average absolute change in bank bill rates relative to size of policy move  




















Note:  Averages calculated over the period 1990–2002 on days when the cash rate was changed. 
Source: RBA 
More generally, when the rationale for monetary policy decisions is better 
understood, it could be expected that markets would be more able to interpret the 
implications of new information, and thus better able to anticipate policy decisions. 
This in turn would mean a smaller market response at the time a policy 
announcement is made. The regression analysis reported in Table 2 supports that 
there has been a reduction over time in the degree to which short-maturity debt 
markets react to policy announcements. The response of 1-month paper to 
monetary policy moves is estimated using OLS. In Equation (1) we regress the 
daily change in 1-month paper  , for country j on a constant  , and changes 
in the policy target rate  .5 Dummy variables   are used to divide the sample 
jt i j 0
jt p  k D
                                           
5  One-month paper is preferred to 3-month paper since it allows us to focus on the surprise 
element of the move itself, rather than the forward-looking information that may accompany 
the move. 
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into the periods used in Table 1.   = 1 prior to January 1990,   = 1 between 
January 1990 and July 1996, and   = 1 from August 1996 to December 2002; 





   (1)  

   
3
1 k
jt jt k kj jt p D i   
The equation is also estimated over the period January 1999 to December 2002 
(without dummies) so New Zealand6 and the euro area can be included in our 
analysis. The estimated constants are not significantly different from zero. The 
estimated coefficients on the policy changes are presented in Table 2. 
In the late 1980s, the market response to rate moves was smaller for Australia since 
rate moves were not announced to the market. In the early 1990s, the financial 
markets responded to policy moves by the RBA to a similar extent as policy moves 
by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. When responses are compared 
across countries since 1996, they are quite similar, with the market on average 
responding by between 22 and 48 per cent of a rate move. A statistical test cannot 
reject that the responses to rate moves in these countries since 1996 are equal.7 The 
range is even narrower since 1999 and once again we cannot reject that the 
responses are equal. The general convergence of these responses is likely to be 
partly reflective of the more stable economic outcomes in recent years, but may 
also reflect similarities in key aspects of central bank communication strategies, 
with all banks examined having adopted a policy of announcing and explaining all 
rate moves. It also suggests that the areas of divergence in transparency 
arrangements do not significantly influence the ability of the market to predict 
moves. 
                                           
6  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand introduced an Official Cash Rate in March 1999. 
7 We  estimate  ijt = 0j + 1j pjt jt for each country over August 1996 to December 2002 and 
test the null hypothesis that 1j for each country is equal using a Wald test. The null was not 
rejected at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
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Table 2: Market Response to Monetary Policy Moves
(a) 
  January 1986 to 
December 1989 
January 1990 to 
July 1996 
August 1996 to 
December 2002 
January 1999 to 
December 2002
(b) 
Australia  0.08*** 0.41*** 0.37***  0.15** 
 (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.06) 
US  0.24*** 0.39*** 0.22**  0.20* 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.10)  (0.11) 
UK  0.30*** 0.41*** 0.25***  0.22*** 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.04)  (0.06) 
Japan  –0.02 0.28**  0.48**  0.25** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)  (0.10) 
Germany/ECB
(c)  0.22*** 0.16*** 0.35***  0.30*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.09)  (0.10) 
Canada
(d)  – –  0.37***  0.18*** 
     (0.11)  (0.06) 
Sweden
(e)  – –  0.31***  0.27*** 
     (0.07)  (0.08) 
New Zealand
(f)  – – –  0.19** 
      (0.08) 
Notes:  (a) Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
  (b) January 1999 to December 2002 results for each country are estimated separately from the results in the
other time periods. 
  (c) The policy rate is calculated as the average of the Deutsche Bundesbank lombard and discount rates 
prior to April 1996 consistent with Hardy (1998). Since variable rate repos were also used as a
monetary policy instrument during this period, this measure of surprises may be an underestimate. 
  (d) The Bank of Canada adopted an operating band for the overnight rate in 1994, with the bank rate tied to 
the upper end of the operating band from February 1996 (Muller and Zelmer 1999). 
  (e) Data for Swedish 1-month paper are available from 1991. 
  (f) Data are from 17 March 1999 when the Reserve Bank of New Zealand introduced an Official Cash 
Rate. 
 
Another way of measuring the extent to which financial markets anticipate 
monetary policy changes is to examine how much of the actual change is already 
factored in over the two-week period leading up to the policy announcement. If we 
assume that market anticipation of a rate move does not enter into the central 
bank’s reaction function, we can test whether the anticipation and pass-through of 
monetary policy moves by the market has changed over time, and whether it 
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differs across countries.8 Using OLS, we estimate the daily difference between the 
1-month paper rate i  and the policy rate  for country j as a function of a 
constant  , and the change in the target policy rate  , led by 10, 5 and 1 
business days, and lagged by five business days: 
jt jt p
j 0  jt p 
   (2)  jt jt j jt j jt j jt j j jt jt p p p p p i                      5 4 1 3 5 2 10 1 0
The results are presented in Table 3 for Australia from January 1986 to 
December 2002, and for other countries in our sample from August 1996 to 
December 2002. The coefficients  ,   and   are estimates of market 
anticipation of monetary policy changes over the two weeks leading up to a move, 
with a value of zero indicating that a rate move was unanticipated over a 1-month 
horizon.   may be interpreted as the proportion of a policy move that was 
anticipated. However,   and   should be interpreted more cautiously. One to 
two weeks prior to a rate move, 1-month paper can be interpreted as an average of 
expectations of an unchanged policy rate prior to a policy move, and a higher or 
lower rate afterwards over the remaining maturity of the paper. Therefore, these 
coefficients will be an underestimate of the proportion of a policy move that was 
anticipated one to two weeks prior to the move. If  is equal to zero, this 
indicates that the policy move has been fully passed through within a week of the 
move, while a positive coefficient suggests the market is pricing in the possibility 
of a subsequent rate move. The constant,  , controls for the existence of an 
average premium of the market rate over the policy rate, and is between 0 and 
16  basis  points for all the countries in our sample over August 1996 to 
December 2002.9 The R




j 1  j 2 
j 4 
j 0
2 coefficients are quite small, but this is not surprising 
given that the regressions do not include variables to explain the variation on other 
days. 
                                           
8 If this assumption is invalid, then the regression that we estimate may suffer from 
endogeneity, which could bias the coefficients. 
9  The constant could include a risk premium along with any average expectation of rate rises or 
cuts over the estimation period. One way to reduce the size of the latter effect would be to 
include more leads and lags of the change in the target policy rate. However, including 
20 leads and 10 lags does not significantly alter the coefficient estimates in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Market Anticipation and Pass-through of Monetary Policy Moves 
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Note:  Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
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From August 1996 to December 2002 over 70 per cent of an RBA cash rate move 
was on average factored in to 30-day bill yields by the day before an 
announcement. This compares with around 50 per cent factored in the day before 
policy changes over the period January 1990 to July 1996, though this is not a 
statistically significant difference.10 The most striking contrast is with the period 
over the second half of the 1980s. About 20 per cent of a move was factored in the 
day preceding a change in the cash rate, significantly lower than in the period since 
1990.11 
Furthermore, the 30-day bill yield in the late 1980s period only changed gradually 
following a policy move, and two weeks later had not fully adjusted to the new 
target cash rate. This can also be illustrated by calculating the average absolute 
difference between the 30-day bank bill rate and the cash rate over the two weeks 
preceding and following a rate move (Figure 3). The result is hardly surprising, 
since cash rate moves were not publicly announced over this period. In contrast, 
over the August 1996 to December 2002 period, rate moves were fully passed 
through quickly, and after a week the market was on average beginning to price in 
a subsequent rate move. 
                                           
10 Using a t-test, it is not possible to reject at the 10 per cent level of significance that the 
anticipation of a policy move the day before was equal in the January 1990 to July 1996 
period and the August 1996 to December 2002 period. 
11 Using a t-test, it is possible to reject at the 5 per cent level of significance that the anticipation 
of a policy move the day before was equal in the January 1986 to December 1989 period and 
the subsequent period. 
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Figure 3: Anticipation and Pass-through of Monetary Policy Moves 
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Notes:    The 30-day bank bill line for the 10 business days before and after a policy move is the average 
absolute difference between the 30-day bank bill rate on each day and the cash rate the day before the 
move. The cash rate line is calculated on the same basis. No adjustment is made for risk premiums. 
Source: RBA 
Excluding Japan, for which there are only five rate moves between August 1996 
and December 2002, there is remarkably little difference in the extent to which 
markets anticipate monetary policy moves across the countries in our sample 
(Figure 4). At the 2-week, 1-week and 1-day horizon, it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that the level of anticipation by the markets of a rate move in each 
country is equal.12 Excluding Japan, the pass-through of rate moves was complete 
across the sample of countries after a week, with markets beginning to significantly 
price in subsequent moves on average in Australia, the US, Canada and Sweden. 
                                           
12 When Equation (2) is estimated for each country over August 1996 to December 2002, using 
a Wald test it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the level of anticipation of a rate 
move at the 2-week, 1-week and 1-day horizon is equal at the 10  per cent level of 
significance. 
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Figure 4: Average Response to Monetary Policy Moves 
August 1996 to December 2002 






































































Notes:    The 1-month paper line for the 10 business days before and after a policy move is the average absolute 
difference between the 1-month paper rate on each day and the cash rate the day before the move. The 
policy rate line is calculated on the same basis. No adjustment is made for risk premiums. 
Sources:   Bank of Canada; Bank of England; ECB; Federal Reserve; RBA; Sveriges Riksbank; 
Thomson Financial Datastream 
The analysis summarised in Table 3 and Figure 4 relates only to the market 
response to changes in the policy rate, but does not provide any insight into 
situations where the market anticipated a monetary policy action that did not 
materialise. In Australia, some large daily changes in 30-day bank bill yields have 
also occurred on days following a Board meeting where it was decided not to move 
interest rates (Figure 5). In recent years, three ‘no move’ decisions surprised the 
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market by around 10 basis points, a similar result to that which followed a number 
of the rate moves during the same period. Surprises of this magnitude tend to occur 
at times close to turning points in the rate cycle, suggesting that markets may 
correctly anticipate a move, but may be uncertain as to the timing. 
Figure 5: Market Response to Monetary Policy Meetings 




























However, compared with other central banks, the average magnitude of the market 
reaction following ‘no move’ decisions by the RBA is not large (Table 4). 
Moreover, the mean response of 3 basis points is about the same as the general 
background volatility in interest rates, and is much lower than the response to rate 
moves. Also noteworthy is a relatively low maximum response to ‘no move’ 
monetary policy decisions. 
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Table 4: Response of 1-month Paper to Monetary Policy Decisions 
January 1999 to December 2002 – absolute change, basis points 

















 Maximum Mean    Maximum Mean  Maximum Mean    
Australia –  –    18 7  14  3  2  70 
US 53  35    22  5  10  2  2  53 
UK 25  25    19  5  19  3  3  69 
Japan –  –    13  6    8  1  2  94 
ECB 42  42    27  9  18  2  1  84 
Canada
(a) 19    9    26  7  21  4  1  21 
Sweden –  –    24  9 16  2 1  75 
NZ –  –    31  8    8  1  2  53 
Note:  (a) Fixed announcement dates began in November 2000. 
 
2.3  Impact on Expectations of Future Monetary Policy 
The impact of policy announcements on interest rate expectations over a longer 
horizon can be examined using interest rate futures prices. Figure 6 plots for 
Australia and the US the average of the absolute change of the 1- and 3-month 
paper and each 3-month futures contract out to the eighth contract (expectations of 
rate moves in just over two years’ time) on the day of a policy move relative to the 
size of the policy move, for the periods 1990 to 1992, 1993 to July 1996 and from 
August 1996 to December 2002.13 As before, relatively small average responses 
would indicate that markets significantly anticipate policy announcements and that 
the information content of announcements is already, to a large extent, reflected in 
market prices. If markets are becoming better informed, the curve describing these 
responses should thus shift downward over time. 
                                           
13 Futures data are unavailable for Australia for the 1986–1989 period. A factor in interpreting 
the results for the futures contracts may be the low liquidity of contracts further out. However, 
low liquidity is likely to have more of an effect on the level of implied futures rates rather 
than the change in implied futures rates. 
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Figure 6: Futures Market Response to Monetary Policy Moves 







































90-day futures contracts  
Sources: Bloomberg;  RBA 
Since 1996, the response of the Australian futures market to policy moves has 
fallen marginally relative to the 1993–1996 period. The response of US futures to 
policy also fell in the late 1990s relative to the 1993–1996 period, consistent with 
policy becoming more transparent. The data also suggest that the futures market 
surprise in Australia increased significantly from 1990–1992 to 1993–1996. The 
low response of futures during the 1990–1992 period may be an outlier, driven by 
the relative predictability of the easing cycle after the high interest rates of the late 
1980s or the limited reaction of longer-maturity paper to policy announcements 
over this period. Figure 7 shows the same information over the period since 1999 
for Australia and the US, as well as the euro area, the UK, Canada and 
New Zealand. The level of the response of interest rate futures in all countries 
shown is quite similar over this period. 
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Figure 7: Futures Market Response to Monetary Policy Moves 










































90-day futures contracts  
Sources: Bloomberg;  RBA 
The shape of the futures market’s response may also hold information. The largest 
surprise in Australia occurs on the second and third futures contracts, reflecting 
changing expectations of rates in roughly 9–12 months’ time. This bulge is 
difficult to interpret because it may be affected by the liquidity of instruments, but 
possibly reflects the signalling value of rate changes (or the accompanying 
explanation of the change) over that horizon. A similar pattern occurs in the UK 
data and, to a lesser extent, in the US data. 
We also examined the difference between the absolute responses of the bill futures 
markets when there is a policy move that changes the direction of interest rates, 
and those occurring with moves that continue a particular rate cycle. Short-term 
yields appear to respond similarly in the two cases. However, the information 
content of rate moves that change the direction of rates appears particularly high 
for expected rates in around a year’s time (Figure 8). This effect does not appear to 
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be driving the hump noted in the previous paragraph, since if the episodes where 
policy rates change direction are excluded, the bulge remains in Figures 6 and 7. 
Figure 8: Futures Market Response to Monetary Policy Moves 
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90-day futures contracts  
Sources: Bloomberg;  RBA 
Similar event-study exercises can be done to assess the financial market response 
to other information from the RBA. Figure 9 evaluates the response of 30-day and 
90-day bank bills and 90-day bank bill futures to the release of the quarterly 
Statement on Monetary Policy (SMP) and the Governor’s Statement to the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public 
Administration. The response to rate moves and the change on other days are 
included for comparison. The average absolute size of market movements for 
virtually all contracts on days when the Governor’s Statement is released is larger 
than the average absolute daily movements on other days, particularly around the 
second and third contracts, which suggests that the market is extracting useful 
information about expected rates in 9–12 months’ time. The response to the 
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Statement on Monetary Policy has also been on average slightly higher than on 
other days around the second futures contract. However, the small number of 
observations makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions. 
Figure 9: Futures Market Response to Monetary Policy News 
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Sources: Bloomberg;  RBA 
2.4  Impact on the Yield Curve 
By appealing to the expectations theory of the term structure, another technique to 
assess the effects of greater transparency is to examine shifts in the yield curve at 
the time of monetary policy changes out to a 10-year horizon. Evidence that the 
yield curve responses have dampened would be consistent with greater 
transparency and credibility of the monetary policy framework and better 
anchoring of inflation expectations. 
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We examine this question using the methodology of Haldane and Read (2000) and 
regress the daily change in market interest rates of maturity m on a constant  , 
changes in the target cash rate p
m 0
US
mt i 1 -
t, changes in the US instrument of corresponding 
interest rate maturity the day before as a proxy for foreign developments  , 
and a regime shift dummy variable M  to capture the change in response. 
   (3)  mt
US
mt m t m t m m mt i p M p i               1 - 3 2 1 0
The regressions are estimated on daily data using OLS for the 30-, 90- and 180-day 
bank bills, and 3-, 5- and 10-year bonds for the period January 1990 to June 2002. 
The  m 1   parameter gives the estimated response of different maturity interest rates 
to a cash rate move. The  m 3   parameter gives the estimated response to a change in 
the US interest rate of corresponding maturity. If the financial markets were 
unaffected by official interest rate changes,  m 1   would be zero for all maturities. 
The parameter  m 2   measures the effect of a more open monetary policy on average 
interest rate surprises. A zero coefficient for all maturities implies a rejection of 
any regime shift in interest rate surprises. The sum of the coefficients  m 1   and  m 2   
measures the size of the average interest rate surprise along the yield curve during 
the new regime period. Equation (3) is very similar to Equation (1), with the 
addition of  . This additional regressor does not significantly change the 
results for 30-day bank bills, but is an important explanator of movements at the 
long end of the yield curve, as discussed in Campbell and Lewis (1998). The 
estimated constants round to zero at the second decimal place. 
US
mt i 1 - 
The results are reported in Table 5, using August 1996 as the date for a regime 
shift, corresponding to the release of the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy. The period covers 18 cash rate changes, compared with 19 cash rate 
changes between 1990 and July 1996. To test the sensitivity of the results to the 
exact dating of the regime change, we also report the coefficient on the regime 
shift dummy variable at the short end and the long end when the regime shift date 
is anywhere between January 1993 and December 2000 in Figure 10. 
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Note:  Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
 
The main results are: 
1. At the short end and the long end of the yield curve, around 25 per cent of 
the variation of interest rate changes is explained, and for maturities in 
between, it is about half as high. 
2. As would be expected, yield curve responses to policy moves tend to be 
larger and more significant among short maturity debt instruments, with 
about 40 per cent of any change in the cash rate flowing through to 30-day 
bank bills. The effects on longer maturities are much smaller and less 
significant. US bond yields appear to be the main driving force behind 
movements in Australian long maturity yields. 
3. The parameter designed to capture the effect of regime change  m 2   is 
insignificant at the short end of the yield curve when the regime shift is 
tested at August 1996 (Table 5). However, when the regime shift is tested 
after July 1997, the surprise to 30-day bank bills has fallen significantly, to 
around 25 per cent of a rate move (Figure 10). This points to a significant 
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fall in the response of short-term market rates to policy announcements in 
the late 1990s, implying increased anticipation of monetary policy decisions. 
4. The response of bond yields has actually risen significantly relative to the 
early 1990s. This may reflect that the response of yields at the long end to 
monetary policy moves have changed sign rather than become larger. 
During the early 1990s, bond yields tended to move in the opposite direction 
to the policy rate on the day of a move, while in the second part of the 
sample, bond yields have generally moved in the same direction as the 
policy rate. This may reflect a stronger anchoring of inflation expectations, 
with the inflation expectations of market participants no longer increasing in 
response to rate cuts. If the regressions in Table 5 are estimated using 
absolute changes in market and policy rates, the absolute response of bond 
yields to rate moves has not increased.14 This also suggests that the sign of 
the response at the long end to rate moves has changed, rather than the size 
of the response. 
                                           
14 When the regression for changes in the 10-year bond yield is estimated using absolute values, 
the regime change coefficient is no longer significant, suggesting that the absolute size of the 
response of 10-year rates to monetary policy has not increased relative to the early 1990s. 
(0.04)                 (0.04)           (0.01)    ) 00 . 0 (          
i 48 . 0 p M 01 . 0 p 03 . 0 04 . 0 i t
US
1 t t t t           -  
  This result is robust to moving the timing of the regime shift dummy between 1996 and 2000. 
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Figure 10: Moving the Timing of the Regime Shift Dummy Variable, M 
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Source: RBA 
In summary, time series analysis indicates a reduced response to policy moves at 
the short end from around mid 1997, consistent with the interpretation that markets 
have become better able to anticipate monetary policy decisions. This finding is 
similar to Haldane and Read (2000), who found that transparency innovations in 
the UK in 1992 significantly lowered the size of shocks to short-end interest rates. 
Muller and Zelmer (1999) found a similar result for Canada associated with 
transparency improvements in 1994. However, the result differs from Bomfim and 
Reinhart (2000), who found that the relationship between monetary policy moves 
and short-end interest rates in the US did not change as a result of disclosure 
reforms introduced in 1994.15 
                                           
15 Ross (2002) also estimates interest rate surprise effects in the US, the UK and Germany/ECB, 
comparing the period 1991–1998 with the period 1999–2002 and finds that variability at the 
short end of the yield curve has fallen in the US and the UK, but has risen in the euro area. 
These cross-country results are consistent with the trends outlined in Table 2. 
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3. Conclusion 
There is no single model of monetary policy transparency, and communication 
arrangements of central banks differ in various respects depending partly on the 
governance and accountability structures in place in each country. Nonetheless 
there has been a common trend towards increased transparency among central 
banks over the past 10–15 years, including in Australia. This paper has attempted 
to discern the impact of this trend on the behaviour of financial markets using data 
for Australia and, where possible, international comparisons. We find that interest 
rate volatility at the short end has fallen dramatically in Australia since the late 
1980s, and the extent to which market participants anticipate changes in the policy 
rate has gradually risen. This is consistent with markets being better informed 
about the policy process and about the likely impact of newly available 
information on monetary policy. The results suggest that the performance of 
Australian financial markets in these respects has been quite similar to the 




Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Interest Rate Data and Sources 
      Policy rate 1-month
(a) 3-month
(a)  90-day futures
(b) 
Australia
(c) Cash  rate:  Bulletin Table A.2
(d) Bank bills: Bulletin Table F.1  Bank bills: Bulletin Table F.1  Bank Bills: IR1–IR8 
US










UK  Base rates: Bank of England  LIBOR: LDNIB1M  LIBOR: LDNIB3M  LIBOR: L1–L8 




(g) FIBOR1M and 
GERMDRM pre-January 1999 
FIBOR:
(g) FIBOR3M and 
GERMDRQ pre-January 1999 
EurIBOR: ER1–ER8 
Japan  Target call rate: Bank of Japan  Euroyen: ECJAP1M  Euroyen: ECJAP3M  – 





Canada Target  rate: Bank of Canada  Bankers acceptances: 
Bank of Canada 
Bankers acceptances: 
Bank of Canada and 
ECCAD3M pre-January 1990 
Bankers acceptances: 
BA1–BA8 
NZ  Cash rate: RBNZ  Bank bills: RBNZ  Bank bills: RBNZ  Bank bills: ZB1–ZB8 
Notes:   (a) Codes from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
  (b) Codes from Bloomberg. 
(c) 180-day bank bills obtained from Bulletin Table F.1; 3-, 5- and 10-year bonds obtained from Bulletin Table F.2. 
(d) RBA internal data prior to 1990. 
(e) Six-month Eurodollar deposits, 3-, 5- and 10-year constant maturity bonds obtained from Federal Reserve website. 
(f) Dungy and Hayward (2000) used prior to 1990. 
(g) The response to policy moves is lagged one day since policy moves announced after market rate is measured. 
(h)  Deutsche Bundesbank repo rate used before 1999 from annual reports, with average of Lombard and discount rates used before April 1996, as in
 Hardy  (1998). 
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